

"Dodd and the Test Ban"

I would like to comment on your editorial of Feb. 22 which misrepresented my position in several respects.

I have never stated or implied anything so preposterous as that this Administration or its predecessor would deliberately imperil the security of the United States. I do contend that the test-ban policy pursued in good faith by both Administrations has already cost us our nuclear superiority over the Soviets, and will gravely imperil our security unless soon revised.

My assumptions are these: Such peace as we have is based upon our nuclear parity with Russia; if the Soviets continue nuclear tests, and we do not, they will develop weapons so superior to ours that they can confront us with a choice between surrender or annihilation; the safeguards in our current test-ban proposal are so inadequate that the Soviets can continue testing in secret, after they have disarmed us through the signing of a treaty.

It is demonstrable that in four years of negotiations, the Soviets have whittled down our detection and inspection provisions to the point where they are only one-tenth as effective as those in our original proposal. And the whittling goes on.

We once demanded the right to inspect all seismic disturbances of a significant size, i. e., several hundred per year; we then dropped to 20, and then to 12, and then to 8, and then to 7, and now to 5.

We once insisted on 600 monitoring stations, then 180, and now 80.

We once insisted that monitoring stations be manned by non-nationals of the country involved. We now accept the principle that these stations may be manned by nationals, which means that the Russians are to be the judges of whether or not they themselves are cheating.

We once excluded from the treaty tests so small that they

could not possibly be detected. We now include these undetectable shots.

We once proposed a Control Body on which no nation had the power of veto. We now give the Communist bloc the veto power.

We have made all of these retreats despite the testimony last September of our Disarmament Director, William Foster, that there has been no improvement in our verification capability.

Continued nuclear testing is essential to the perfection of the antimissile missile and to the development of the neutron bomb. The nation which first perfects either of these weapons will decisively overturn the balance of power. The kind of testing involved here is underground testing of small yields, which is precisely the kind most easily hidden. Under the provisions of this treaty, our chance of detecting sneak tests is one in a thousand. I am not willing to stake the survival of this country on such a gamble.

The question, then, recurs: Is it possible that any administration would negotiate a treaty as dangerous as I contend this one to be?

The *Washington Post* answers "no" and its answer seems to be based more on an act of faith than on an examination of fact. As a Senator it is my duty to assume that such a mistake is possible; and the history of all major nations in the twentieth century is replete with mistakes of similar magnitude.

There is one supreme question which the Senate must ask about any nuclear test-ban treaty: Does it provide reasonable protection against cheating by the Soviets? If it does not it is worthless, worse than worthless, because it could lead to our national destruction. In my judgment, the present proposal of the United States does not meet that test. And so I am against it.

THOMAS J. DODD.

U.S. Senator from Connecticut.
Washington.